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There are two basic types of "exclusive" territorial arrangements. The
first is an exclusive franchise, which is a promise by the manufacturer not to
sell to another outlet in a given area. The second is a "closed territory"-a
promise from dealer to manufacturer not to sell in another dealer's territory.'
The subject of this comment is the promise unning from dealer to manufacturer
which creates the "closed territory." Customer restrictions will not be included,
but it is noteworthy that theoretically, a restriction to one type or class of cus-
tomer can represent an effective territorial restriction if, within an easily accessible
area (determined by freight rates or practical advertising limits, for example)
there are only a limited number of the allowed class of customers. Although it
is possible to have a dosed territory without an exclusive franchise, this comment
further assumes the existence of the latter.
There have been many consent decrees in which manufacturers agree to
cease using closed territories,2 but there has been little case law. The problem is
further complicated by the fact that while commentators commonly differentiate
between exclusive selling arrangements (hereinafter referred to as exclusive fran-
chises), restrictive territories (hereinafter referred to as closed territories) and
customer restrictions, 3 the courts have, until White Motor Co. v. United States,
4
generally treated them together as "closed territories."5 In that case Justice
Brennan, concurring, distinguished customer and geographic restrictions.6
Both exclusive franchises and closed territories are an effort by the manu-
facturer 7 to market his goods effectively. Two main reasons are commonly given
1. See generally Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws-
A Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 223 (1962).
2. See, e.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69,065
(D.N.J.); United States v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. 68,957
(S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69,011 (W.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. f1 69,207 (D.R.I.); United States v. American
Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,542 (N.D. Ill.).
3. See, e.g., Day, supra note 1; Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under
The Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 111 (1962); Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution:
An Opening Question In The Sherman Act, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286 (1962); Note, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 795 (1962).
4. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See also Snap-On Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Laundries, 1961 Trade Cas. T 70,039 at 78,
179 (2d Cir.), where the court, in considering an horizontal territorial division said, "We fail
to see any significant difference between an allocation of customers and an allocation of
territory."
6. 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963).
7. The restrictions are not always manufacturer-imposed, but may be demanded by a
powerful distributor before he will spend his capital on developing the outlet. Sandura Co.
v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) [ 71, 332 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1964). Comment, 47
Marq. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1963), Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 806 (1962). Indeed, "it is likely
to be the dealer who asks for it." Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418, 421 (1957) (emphasis added), citing Handler, Annual Antitrust Review, 11 Record
of N.Y.C.B.A. 367, 372 (1956).
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for such restrictions. First, it is necessary for the "orderly marketing of goods," 8
and secondly, it assures the dealer a sufficient market 9 The fact that a manu-
facturer can often obtain substantial benefit by voluntarily limiting his distribu-
torships in any given area'0 is a further indication that in many cases his promise
to do so is forced by the dealer."' That is, in order to get the best dealers, or to
get the best results out of existing dealers, the manufacturer must promise them
exclusive franchises.1 2 The reason for imposing closed territories then becomes
one of protecting a previously granted exclusive franchise from the hazards of
cross-selling. 13 Such cross-selling is an inevitable result of both dealer and cus-
tomer mobility; it is often extremely easy for a dealer to go into another ter-
ritory for customers, and often even easier for a customer to buy in another
territory.' 4 The dealer may be tempted because it sometimes takes less effort
to "skim the cream," i.e., sell to the best or most easily reached customers in an
adjacent territory, than to expend the additional time, effort and money in
making additional sales in one's own territory.
Once the closed territory is imposed, certain benefits accrue to the manu-
facturer which he may not lawfully obtain by contract. As an example, the
dealer, now assured an adequate market, will be discouraged from handling com-
peting lines, though the manufacturer might not legally be able to impose such
a restriction.' The closed territory also makes it easier for the manufacturer to
distribute his goods, as volume is constant.'8 It is also of aid in tracing defec-
tive goods, an important consideration, for example, in the drug industry.
17
8. 47 Marq. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1963). This is at best a vague and inconclusive state-
ment. Treating only of an exclusive franchise, the manufacturer benefits because of lower
selling costs (due to a restricted number of buyers); often the manufacturer is able to
minimize his risk by picking only the most solvent dealers. This may confer a "prestige"
benefit on him. Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 805 (1962). See Banning, Techniques for
Marketing New Products at 55 (1957); Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly
Marketing of Goods, 45 Cornell L.Q. 254 (1960).
9. 47 Marq. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1963).
10. See note 3, supra.
11. Ibid.
12. See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 805 (1962).
13. It is hazardous because when another dealer's territory is encroached upon, one of
two things will happen: he will either be driven out of business, leaving the manufacturer
with no assurance that the remaining dealers will handle the entire vacated area instead of
merely the "cream" accounts, or the offended dealer will fight back, in which case effort will
be expended over a customer likely to buy that brand anyway (though it may result in lower
consumer prices). Id. at 812. Thus, in the lower court, White Motor argued that "To
obtain the maximum number of sales of trucks in a given area, the White Motor Company
has to insist that its distributors and dealers concentrate on trying to take sales away from
other competing truck manufacturers in their respective territories rather than on cutting
each others throats in other territories." White Motor Co. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 562,
578 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
14. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) II
71, 329 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1964).
15. 47 Marq. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1963). The restricting statute is section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 14 (1958).
16. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1956)
(prepared statement of Charles M. Hewitt).
17. A somewhat less praiseworthy benefit is that the dosed territory also makes it easier
to spot price-cutting dealers.
COMMENTS
Closed territories are enforced by profit passovers, under which the offend-
ing dealer must give his profit on the sale (or a percentage thereof) to the dealer
in whose territory the sale was made, and by simple franchise cancellation, a
rather drastic and thus little-used measure. Other enforcement methods include
refusal by the manufacturer to ship to a customer outside the dealer's territory,
or a curtailment of the dealer's allotment of the line of goods the dealer has
been cross-selling.' 8
According to one commentator, it is often difficult to determine whether a
given arrangement is in effect an exclusive franchise or a closed territory.19 In
terms of a definite agreement, it is of course rather easy, but such situations are
in reality rare.20 In many instances there is not even an oral agreement-merely
an "understanding"-derived from the business circumstances.21
CURRENT LEGAL STATUS
The Exclusive Franchise Background and the Position of Exclusive Franchise
under the Anti-Trust Laws
The lower court in White Motor22 distinguished closed territories from ex-
clusive franchises stating that exclusive franchises ". . . have been upheld as
reasonable when ancillary to the sale of goods for resale because they protect
the vendee's property rights in his resale business from being destroyed or
damaged by the actions of his vendor who is in a position to undersell, or es-
tablish a competitor of, his vendee. ' ' 2 3 Territorial restrictions were, however,
held illegal per se, since they constituted market allocation among competitors.
Here the court cited horizontal market allocation cases.2 4 The court bridged the
gap between horizontal and vertical market allocation with Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 25 in which the court held resale price-main-
tenance contracts among manufacturing distributors and retailers illegal. A
unilateral decision by a manufacturer to limit -his outlets does not violate the
antitrust laws, absent any monopoly or monopolization problem.2 6 This is so
18. Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 814-17 (1962).
19. Id. at 809.
20. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) was such an exception.
See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 802 (1962).
21. Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 802 (1962). See generally Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 655 (1962).
22. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), reversed, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
23. 194 F. Supp. 562, 578 (1961).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
25. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Court relied also on United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
26. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See also United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 353 U.S. 29 (1960); Oppenheim, The Parke, Davis Decision: Colgate's
Permissible Suggested Resale Price Policy is Neither Dead Nor Sterile, 17 A.B.A. Antitrust
Section 215 (1960); Turner, op. cit. supra note 21, at 703-04 (1962); cf. Kors v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd
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even though it be at the behest of the dealer. After all, "Such decisions are not
made in a vacuum. ' 27 In this matter at least, the Federal Trade Commission has
followed the courts.28 Although commonly found in conjunction with an exclu-
sive franchise, the closed territory must be considered as a separate entity, and
its cumulative effect, when found with an exclusive franchise, is not determina-
tive of its legality 2 9
Early History of Closed Territories
The case law on closed territories is sparse. In 1917, a judge charged a jury
that closed territories were illegal, whether by agreement among the dealers or
imposed by the manufacturer.80 This was based on the assumption that what the
dealers could not lawfully agree to do among themselves, the manufacturer
could not impose on them, as the result was the same.31 The first case directly
on the question3 2 upheld the closed territory, consistent with the common law
doctrine of allowing a seller to impose a condition on a buyer that the product
would not be used to compete with the seller.33
as modified, 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Court struck down an elaborate price-fixing scheme but
let stand an exclusive distributorship. Since that time the courts have generally assumed
their legality. See Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957);
Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
reversing, 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). It is important to
note that the reversing court in the Packard case relied on the relevant market test of
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (the Cellophane case
with its reasonable interchangeability test). How the case would have fared under the
relevant submarket test of United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957) is another question. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271 (1964).
Reliable Volkswagen S & S Co. v. World-Wide Auto Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J.
1960) involved uncertain relevant market definitions and monopoly allegations, and was
distinguished from the Schwing and Packard cases.
United States v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 405 (D.N.J. 1960) was con-
cerned with the legality of exclusive territorial arrangements as part of an illegal price-fixing
scheme. See Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Sherman Act-A Reappraisal,
40 N.C.L. Rev. 241 n.2.
27. Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Md. 1956),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). The trial
Court went on "To say that a manufacturer may legally decide to reduce the number of its
dealers in a given area if it does not discuss the matter with the dealers beforehand, but
violates the anti-trust laws if it does discuss the matter with them before the new agree-
ments are made, ignores the realities." 138 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Md. 1956).
28. Columbus Coated Fabrics, 5 FTC 1500 (1959).
29. In Snap-On Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), the Court of Appeals in
reversing the FTC held restrictive provisions of the "Dealer Agreement" must be considered
seriatim, not collectively.
30. Lowe Motor Supplies Co. v. Weed Chain Tire Grip Co., V CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
fI 5,506, p. 537 (6th ed. 1928) (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Defendant, of course, objected to this charge.
Id. at 539.
31. See Commissioner McCollough dissenting in Matter of General Cigar Co., Inc.,
16 FTC 537, 538 (1932): "Of course, a manufacturer has the legal right to choose his
customers and to limit them in numbers, but he has not the legal right by exacted promises
or by cooperative or coercive methods, to restrain his customers from making resales outside
of allocated territory."
32. Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903).
33. 2 Restatement Contracts § 516(b) (1932). See Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted
Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 111, 143 (1962).
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Cole Motor Car Company v. Hurst3 4 dealt with the problem of whether a
principal could control an agent's territory, but the Court of Appeals did sug-
gest that closed territories were reasonable under federal law. This decision fur-
nished a precedent for Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.35 in which the
lower court, in a Sherman Act action, ruled the closed territory valid.3 6 On
appeal, a limitation was imposed by the Court of Appeals finding that defend-
ant's uncontradicted affidavit refuted plaintiff's allegation that plaintiff could
sell only in his "zone of influence." 37 Thus this limited holding in reality af-
firms only the legality of ". . . what in effect was an exclusive selling arrange-
ment.... The result is that, aside from the untested district court dicta in Boro
Hall, there is no definitive federal court decision on closed territories.138
Within a space of 29 years the FTC considered the question of closed ter-
ritories only twice,39 first in the General Cigar case4" and then in Snap-On
Tools.41 In the former case, the complaint alleging closed territories was dismis-
sed without opinion; in the latter case, the practice was found illegal. This was
reversed on appeal.42 The Commission had distinguished Boro Hall,43 and being
averse to skeletons in the closet, buried General Cigar in a footnote, saying it
had "... little precedential significance now."
44
Territorial restrictions have been considered within the framework of a
price-fixing scheme. In United States v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.45 the plain-
tiff alleged a comprehensive price-fixing scheme between Volkswagen of America
(VOA) and fourteen distributors. Dealers and the manufacturer were alleged co-
conspirators, but were not made defendants. It was alleged that:
1. distributors will sell to dealers at prices fixed by VOA, manufacturer and
Volkswagen United States (VUS. This was substantially the same in
personnel and purpose as VOA and was formed for the importation dis-
tribution and sale of Volkswagen automobiles in the United States);
34. 228 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1915), 246 F.2d 831 (1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918).
35. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), petition for rek. denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
36. Rifkind, Division of Territories, Antitrust Law Symposium, 1953, reprinted in
2 Hoffman's Antitrust Law and Techniques, 49, 54 (Hoffman & Winard ed. 1963).
37. 124 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1942). A "zone of influence" is an area of primary
responsibility for a dealer, in which he must meet certain sales requirements before he is
permitted to make sales outside of it.
38. Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A Reappraisal,
40 N.C.L. Rev. 233, 237 (1962). The author comments that one reason for the scarcity of
authority is the Justice Department's success in obtaining consent decrees in which manu-
facturers promise not to use dosed territories. See note 2, supra.
39. Id. at 240.
40. 16 FTC 537 (1932).
41. No. 7116 FTC (1961), rev'd, 321 F.2d 825 (1963).
42. 321 F.2d 825 (1963). See Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 185 (1963); Note,
1964 Duke L.J. 408; Comment, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 1377 (1964).
43. No. 7116 FTC (Nov. 1, 1961) at 6.
44. Id. at 8, n.8. See also Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question
In the Sherman Act, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286, 288 (1963).
45. 182 F. Supp. 405 (D.N.J. 1960).
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2. dealers will sell to purchasers at prices set by VOA, VUS and the manu-
facturer;
3. distributors will sell to franchised dealers only;
4. co-conspirator dealers will not sell to others for resale;
5. each distributor will sell only to those franchised dealers located within
the distributor's assigned territory;
6. dealers will sell only to customers in his exclusive territory;
7. distributors and dealers will not sell competing cars;
8. distributors will terminate sales agreements or cut quantity of cars al-
located to dealers violating these terms.
In holding that the territorialization allegations could not be dealt with on
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court said the price-fixing charges precluded
determination of their legal efficacy and went on to frame two issues: first,
whether or not the territorialization was designed to assist price-maintenance,
and secondly, if so, its utility in so doing.46 Even assuming its legality, the
court refused to dismiss the territorialization charges, saying:
It does not follow that practices legal per se when considered
alone, are necessarily so whatever the context in which they are
found.4 "
Thus there is here no treatment of closed territories on their own merits. (Query
whether they ever can be, since they are not usually found except in concert with
circumstances similar to the above allegations.) 48
Reliable Volkswagen S & S Co. v. World Wide Auto Corp.49 was a suit by
a dealer against other dealers, distributors, VOA, VUS and the manufacturer,
alleging cut-off of his promised supply of Volkswagen automobiles. Charges
were brought under section 3 of the Clayton Act that dealers agreed to handle
no other makes of cars. Plaintiff also urged that other distributors would not
sell to him after the cut-off, as he was outside their assigned territory, and that
this violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 violations were alleged in
that defendants had a monopoly on the sale of Volkswagen cars and parts.
The court said that the territorialization charges must be isolated, as there
was no allegation of violation per se of the antitrust laws, and that their obvious
deficiency was failure to allege a public or even a private injury." Thus the
allegations of closed territories were dismissed on a point of pleading.
Questions of trademark protection were raised in Denison Mattress Factory
46. Id. at 411.
47. Id. at 412.
48. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Snap-On Tools v.
FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Sealy, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964
Trade Cas.) ff 71,258 (N.D. Il. Oct. 6, 1964); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1f 71,329 (N.D. 11. Dec. 29, 1964); Sandura Co. v. FTC, Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) f1 71,332 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1964), all of which involved either
agreements or situations in which more than closed territories were involved.
49. 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.NJ. 1960).
50. Id. at 225.
COMMENTS
v. Spring-Air Co.51 The Spring-Air Company was composed of thirty-four small
bedding manufacturers who were Spring-Air shareholders. They contributed
advertising funds and were licensed by Spring-Air to use its trademark on bed-
ding meeting Spring-Air specifications. Spring-Air sued when defendant with-
drew without paying its assessment. The defense consisted of allegations of:
1. division of trade territory;
2. requirements contracts for materials;
3. price-fixing;
4. restrictions on manufacturing of competing products;
5. restraints on sale or use of products and materials after termination of
the contract.52
The trial court held for the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
saying the plaintiff had not only a right, but a duty to protect its trademark,
and that where division of territories is not the central purpose of the agreement,
the licensor can impose closed territories.53 The court did not deal with the pos-
sibility that this could be viewed as an horizontal agreement among joint ven-
turers (as the licensees were all shareholders of plaintiff) and thus illegal under
settled principles of horizontal market allocation.
White Motor v. United States,54 although deciding only that a per se rule
was inapplicable at the time, gives indications of the Court's view of closed ter-
ritories. The majority opinion mentions four instances in which they might be
allowed: when used by a small company in the face of aggressive competition,
where a small company must use them either to break into, or stay in business,
and where the company is failing. The concurring opinion draws a distinction
between dealer and manufacturer imposed restrictions, saying the former would
be illegal under horizontal market allocation principles. Their effect on inter-
brand competition is vital: "Surely it would be significant to the disposition of
this case if... some such arrangement were a prerequisite for effective compe-
tition on the part of independent manufacturers of trucks." 55
51. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).
52. Id. at 406.
53. Id. at 409, citing Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899
(D. Md. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823(1957).
54. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
55. Id. at 268-69.
"White Motor apparently stands for several important propositions concerning fran-
chises: (a) restrictive provisions regarding territorial and customer division do not of
themselves render a franchise program illegal; (b) the legality of vertical integration by
contract, including franchise systems, can be determined only in the context of the factual
background of the industry concerned; (c) insofar as a franchise system may result in
horizontal price-fixing, it falls under the prohibition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but
this does not mean that the entire program is necessarily unlawful. If a system of fixing
prices, however, includes restrictive practices which are not independent of the price-fixing,
such restrictive practices may be prohibited... 2" Statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
POST White Motor DEVELOPMENTS
Snap-On Tools
Although the holding of White Motor is expressly limited to the need for
a trial, there are some later cases upon which the practitioner can attempt pre-
diction as to how territorial restrictions will fare in the courts.
The first of these is Snap-On Tools v. FTC.? In upholding Snap-On's
"Dealer Agreement" which included exclusive franchises, closed territories and
customer restrictions, 57 the Court of Appeals found it had no real collective
anti-competitive effect. Under this holding, a simple closed territory by itself
would be a fortiori valid, although seldom encountered except in concert with
other restrictions similar to those found in the Snap-On "Dealer Agreement."" 8
The court reasoned that a minimal curtailment of intrabrand competition was
justified if promotive of competition on the interbrand level?' Although this
has been interpreted as a misuse of the White Motor decision,00 in view of that
Court's limited holding, it would not seem to be so. Admittedly, a manufac-
turer can more easily justify a closed territory under the Snap-On decision than
under the more exhaustive scrutiny of the White Motor concurrence, but the ma-
jority opinion in White specifically limited its holding to the necessity of a trial
to determine the effect and legality of territorial and customer restrictions."'
Recent Cases
Three recent cases indicate the thinking of two courts on the validity of
closed territories.62 In United States v. Sealy, a mattress licensor was charged
in a civil suit with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by allocating exclusive
territories and fixing uniform retail prices.6 3 Defendant admitted its licensees
were licensed to manufacture and sell Sealy products in specific geographical
56. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
57. The "Dealer Agreement" contained, inter alia, clauses providing that:
1. dealer would sell only at price fixed by Snap-On, where legal under fair
trade laws.
2. dealer would sell only within his allocated territory.
3. dealer shall not sell to certain reserved customers.
Snap-On Tools v. FTC, Brief and Appendix for Respondent, p. 3, n.3. Note however that
the Dealer Agreement did not in form couple the closed territory with an exclusive
dealership:
2. The Company hereby assigns to the Dealer, not as an agent, a non-exclusive
franchise for the sale of its products only within the territory described below ....
Id. p. 46 of Appendix. It was conceded however, that the term "non-exclusive" referred
only to petitioner's sales directly to certain customers in the territory, and not to sales
therein by any other dealer. Id. p. 21 of Brief.
58. See notes 48, 57 supra.
59. 321 F.2d 825, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1963).
60. Note, 5 B.C. Comm. & Ind. L. Rev. 185, 189 (1963).
61. 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963).
62. United States v. Sealy, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) fi 71,258 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 6, 1964); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.)
II 71,329 (NJD. Ill. Dec. 29, 1964); Sandura Co. v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.)
ff 71,332 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1964).
63. Sealy was found guilty of the latter charge, and because the court considered the
allegations separately, discussion of this charge is omitted.
472
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areas,'04 but contended that the restrictions were reasonably ancillary to the
proper protection and exploitation of its trademarks, patents, processes and
manufacturing and merchandising techniques 65 -in other words, a combination
of business convenience and trademark protection. Sealy also noted the
licensing arrangements promoted competition in the bedding industry, and
that vigorous competition in the field made the restraints Teasonable. Thus, it
argued, the relief prayed for was contrary to the public interest. 66 Sealy also
defended on the ground that its licensees were still allowed to, and many evi-
dently did, manufacture and sell non-Sealy bedding as long as it was not passed
off as "Sealy. ''67
The court severed the price-fixing from the territorial restriction allegations,
treated them separately, 68 and found the territorialization did not violate the
antitrust laws.69 The court concluded .that Sealy's business conduct7" was not
indicative of a corporation originated and operated for the purpose of dividing
the United States among competing mattress manufacturers, as alleged.71 Ad-
ditionally, the court found the executive committee had, in 1933, seriously con-
sidered and rejected a proposal that the eight Sealy licensees then in existence
divide the United States among themselves.72 The court found the evidence es-
tablished the licensing agreements were developed in the early 1920's for legiti-
mate business purposes, and that Sealy's objective was not market division
among licensees, but rather obtaining additional licensees and more intensive
sales coverage. 3 It concluded as a matter of law that the Government had not
proven a conspiracy to allocate territories among competitors in unreasonable
restraint of trade, and that the assignment of exclusive territories did not violate
the antitrust laws.74
Considered from the point of view of a conspiracy among licensees, this con-
clusion is probably correct. Sealy's hand was heavy in changes among terri-
64. United States v. Sealy, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) 71,258 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 6, 1964), at 80,071.
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 80,072.
67. Id. at 80,071.
68. Id. at 80,072.
69. Ibid.
70. Sealy presented testimonial and documentary evidence expressly limited to the
price-fixing allegations of the complaint.
71. The court's opinion seems to imply a distinction between an attempt to divide the
territory (here the United States) among existing licensees and an attempt to cover the
territory by adding licensees as necessary. Sealy continually sought new licensees to fill
uncovered territory; licensees relinquished territory not within their natural trading areas
and Sealy continually shifted territories among licensees, discontinuing some contracts. These
facts, says the court, ". . . are incompatible with a finding that the Sealy licensees conspired
to allocate territories among themselves." The court also noted the restrictions were im-
posed by Sealy, not the licensees. Id. at 80,077.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 80,083. This does not really answer the question, as a company may achieve
more intensive coverage by eliminating competition on the dealer (here licensee) level thru
the use of restricted territories, which, it is arguable, Sealy was attempting to do.
74. Id. at 80,106-07.
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tories,75 and although it appears obvious the licensees knew much about each
other's business, Sealy's control of territorial allocation precludes a conspiracy on
the part of existing licensees to divide the United States, at least as of 1933.76
Nevertheless, it seems clear the dominant theme is one of licensor-imposed ter-
ritorial allocation; what Sealy undoubtedly tried to do was blanket the United
States with licensees, each restricted to his territory.77
A finding that the practice is reasonably ancillary to the exploitation of a
trademark indicates the court based its opinion on the intent or purpose inherent
in setting up the restrictions. In this respect the case resembles Denison v. Spring
Air; both are small businesses attempting to protect trademarks. Under the
Sealy decision, therefore, a licensor who has long practiced territorial restriction
of its licensees, and who is engaged in constant addition, deletion and shifting
of those licensees to obtain maximum market coverage may employ closed ter-
ritories if reasonably ancillary to trademark exploitation provided there is no
intent on the part of the licensor or licensees to divide the market among a
fixed group of competitors."8 In effect, it gives blanket approval to closed terri-
torial restrictions.
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.70 involved a business whose eco-
nomic position was midway between that of Sealy, a going concern, and San-
dura,80 a small business struggling to survive. The government's complaint,
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleged a combination and con-
spiracy among Schwinn, its distributors, Schwinn Cycle Distributors Associa-
tion (SCDA) and B.F. Goodrich (BFG)81 as evidenced by the following prac-
tices:
1. The number of franchised retailers in each area was limited with con-
currence of a wholesaler co-conspirator who was to sell only to such
franchised retailer.
2. BFG was permitted to sell Schwinn products only to BFG outlets.
75. Id. at 80,076. See generally the court's Findings of Fact passim.
76. Id. at 80,077. Findings of Fact IV, passim.
77. Id. at 80,076.
78. Justice Brennan, concurring in White Motor analogizes closed territories to hori-
zontal market division among competitors, and indicates that whether the impetus for their
use comes from the manufacturer or the dealers is vital:
If it were clear that the territorial restrictions involved in this case had been
induced solely or even primarily by appellant's dealers and distributors, it would
make no difference to their legality that the restrictions were formally imposed by
the manufacturer rather than through inter-dealer agreement. 372 U.S. 253, 267(1963). (Footnote omitted.)
The origin of the agreement would be difficult to prove, and in terms of economic con-
sequences, it is irrelevant.
79. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.)
ff 71,329 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1964).
80. See the Sandura discussion infra. Schwinn's market share fell from 22.5% in 1951
to 12.8% in 1961. The largest bicycle manufacturer in 1961 had 21.8% of the market. Id at
80,376.
81. B. F. Goodrich did not go to trial because of a consent decree to which neither
Schwinn nor SCDA was a party.
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3. BFG outlets and franchised retailers in certain states were required
to adhere to Schwinn-fixed prices.
4. Price-cutting franchised retailers or price-cutting BFG outlets, or those
selling to non-authorized retail dealers were to be reported to Schwinn,
and henceforth not supplied by Schwinn, BFG or wholesale co-con-
spirators.
5. Wholesaler co-conspirators were given an exclusive area with respect to
other wholesalers and were to sell only in that area.
6. Franchised retailers were required to buy only from the wholesaler co-
conspirator authorized to sell in that area, and to sell only from the area
specifically franchised.32
The government took the position that all aspects of the complaint, in-
cluding price-fixing and boycotting, were so interwoven as to constitute one
overall, vertical conspiracy among Schwinn, wholesalers, SCDA members and
all franchised retailers.8 3 The gist of the closed territory allegations was a con-
spiracy existing since 1952 among these parties to allocate territories and sup-
press competition by a dual system, in which distributors sold only in their
territory and dealers bought only from their territorial distributor. This allegedly
was enforced by Schwinn.8 4
Schwinn's principal defense was that the challenged practices were reason-
ably ancillary to its main purpose of waging effective interbrand competition
with the larger integrated bicycle sellers, and that its conduct must be con-
sidered in the light of conditions in the bicycle business.8 5 Although this is sub-
stantially the same defense Sealy presented, it is more convincing as a business
necessity when raised by Schwinn 6 than by Sealy where (aside from trademark
exploitation) it was evidently a mere convenience. Schwinn further contended
that the territories had been created by natural boundaries and available trans-
portation, that a dealer was not compelled to buy from a specific distributor,
and that some territories had more than one dealer.
After finding Schwinn not guilty of price-fixing, the court said it had a right
to assign areas of primary responsibility 'to either Schwinn Plan87 agent-dis-
tributors, or independent contractor distributors. But the agreement between
Schwinn and certain SCDA members, SCDA itself and certain franchised re-
82. ff 71,329 at 80,376.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. at 80,385.
85. Id. at 80,377.
86. See note 80, supra.
87. The Schwinn Plan was a method devised to meet Depression-caused capitalization
problems. Under it, the franchised dealer could buy either directly from the Schwinn factory
or from the distributor's warehouse. If the dealer chose to buy from the factory, the
distributor forwarded the order to the factory, which shipped to the dealer, billing him and
extending him credit. Schwinn then paid the distributor a commission equalling the difference
between the distributor's cost and the Schwinn Plan price of the bicycle. Distributors were
not (and are not) compelled to use this plan, and some do not. The plan eliminates one
handling of the bicycle. Usually, dealers purchase their basic inventory under the plan, and
fill in orders from the distributor's warehouse stock. Id. at 80,377.
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tailers, by which distributors' sales were confined to areas of prime responsibility
was really a closed territory, and a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.88
A third important case dealing with the problem of closed territories is
Sandura Co. v. FTC.8 9 Sandura, a floor-covering manufacturer, is a small con-
cern, completely overshadowed by three giant, integrated companies 0 (as well
as others), to whom it is currently losing ground.91 Because of a product failure
which nearly forced it into bankruptcy, the company was faced with dealer,
distributor and customer dissatisfaction which caused sales to fall from a 1950
high of $7,000,000 to a 1954 low of $3,557,000.92 Confronted with the problem
of persuading distributors to handle a dubious line and to bear, as well, the ad-
vertising costs (which Sandura was financially unable to meet), the company
recruited new distributors. They were not so new, however, as to take Sandura's
product line without the special inducement of a closed exclusive territory. 3
Many distributors testified that they would not have handled Sandura's products
on any other terms.94 According to the evidence, this is still the case,05 and
perhaps with good reason-Sandura sales rose to a 1959 high of $24,001,523,
but by 1962 had fallen to $11,023,041, with a before-tax credit loss of
$200,119.96
The complaint was brought under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. Based on the economic evidence, the court, reversing the Commission,
found the acknowledged elimination of competition, by the use of closed terri-
tories, necessary for Sandura's "very survival 097 and continued economic effec-
tiveness, even though the court also found Sandura not to be a "failing com-
pany." The evidence shows the minimal restraint (the only degree of restraint
allowable under the antitrust laws to accomplish a purpose) in this case was
the continued use of closed territories. 98 In view of Sandura's precarious condi-
tion, it seems difficult to quarrel with the court's opinion without taking the
rather extreme position that territorial restrictions are illegal per se, and that
a business must be able to survive without them. Essentially, the FTC and the
court differed on the implications of the evidence, with the latter being very im-
88. Id. at 80,391.
89. Sandura Co. v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) i 71,332 (6th Cir. Dec. 30,
1964). See discussion in Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question In the
Sherman Act, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286 (1962).
90. Armstrong, Congoleum-Nairn, and Pabco (now Pabco division of Fiberboard
Paper Products Company). In 1958 Sandura's sales of $19,634,000 was 4.8% of hard floor-
covering industry sales. At the most it owned 132% of industry assets.
91. Sandura Co. v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) fi 71,332 at 80,396 (6th
Cir. Dec. 30, 1964).
92. Id. at 80,397.
93. Ibid.
94. Id. at 80,398.
95. Id. at 80,399.
96. Id. at 80,397. The sales decline was in yearly steps, after the 1959 high, as follows:
1960, $16,394,061; 1961, $13,718,297.
97. Id. at 80,401.
98. Ibid.
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pressed with distributor testimony99 to the effect that they would not have
handled Sandura's products without closed territories. The FTC's position was
that they were not necesary. If the use of closed territories can be justified by
other than a corporation in extremis, (which presumably could be saved by in-
voking the "failing company" doctrine) then it would seem Sandura had that
justification. This comports with the majority opinion in White Motor: "...
they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only
practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in busi-
ness. .. .-00 Under the concurring opinion, Sandura might not have fared so
well.101
CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Since the earlier cases on closed territories arose at a time when antitrust
policy and economic conditions varied substantially from what they are today,
it is safe to say that the modern law of closed territories is based on White Motor
and succeeding cases. 10 2 White Motor, though deciding only that summary judg-
ment is not yet a proper procedural device for disposition of the issue,10 3 furnishes
valuable guidelines for judging the legality of these restrictions. The central
questions are first, do they restrain trade, 04 and if so, is the restraint justified?
Once it is concluded, as it was in White Motor, that the rule of per se illegality
is inapplicable, then
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 10 5 (Emphasis added.)
With respect to the use of closed territories as a restriction, this inquiry
will involve the factors set forth in White Motor, namely:
1. is the restriction being used to protect against aggressive competitors?
99. Id. at 80,398-99.
100. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
101. See note 78, supra.
102. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Snap-On Tools v. FTC,
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Sealy, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade
Cas.) ff 71,258 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1964); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) R 71,329 (N.D. Il. Dec. 29, 1964); Sandura Co. v. FTC, Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff 71,332 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1964).
103. 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963): "... we believe that the applicable rule of law should
be designed after a trial."
104. Cases involving territorial restrictions can be brought under the Sherman Act
§ 1, as a "restraint of trade," under the Clayton Act § 3, if its effects "may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly," or under the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 5, as an "unfair method of competition." At the present time, it would seem
to make no difference as to which Act charges are brought under, in terms of relevant defense
and justifications.
105. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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2. is it the only means a small company has either to break into or to stay
in business?
3. is the company failing?
4. was the restriction manufacturer or dealer induced?
5. is it necessary for effective interbrand competition?
6. is it more restrictive than necessary?
7. are there less restrictive alternatives?
8. is its use reasonably related to the needs which brought it into being?
In short, legality for the present will not be tested without a thorough economic
analysis.
There is no question that closed territories, when used in conjunction with
an exclusive franchise, restrain and may eliminate intrabrand competition. 10 0
The issue then is economic justification. It seems clear that at the present time,
a company in Sandura's condition will be able to use closed territories. If "the
general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open mar-
kets,"'01 7 then the course most promotive of that competition is to uphold closed
territories where necessary to survival. However, if the emphasis is placed on
the phrase "open markets," then it is arguable that such restraints may not be
used, even though the result may be failure of the business. The life of a com-
pany with an inferior product or management should not be unnaturally ex-
tended by sheltering it from the antitrust laws. On balance it would seem more
consonant with current antitrust policy to uphold territorial restraints in such
a situation, as the present view seems to be that the existence of competition
even if weak, is preferable to no competition at all.
More difficult problems arise when there is no survival issue, but where
the claimed justification is product protection through, for example, necessary
servicing or trademark protection. This arises in the Sealy and Sclnvinn, cases.
Factually, these two cases are distinguishable. First, the Schwinn court found
an horizontal conspiracy; secondly, economic position varied; thirdly, Sealy in-
volved royalty income to the licensor (arguably giving him a greater interest in
the licensees' activities), and many concurrent activities directed primarily
toward obtaining additional licensees rather than maintaining market divisions
among a few existing distributors, as revealed by the evidence in Schwinn. In
short, there was in Sealy no intent to divide and maintain existing closed terri-
tories for the purpose of eliminating competition on the distributor level. Of
course, a good intention will not save an otherwise objectionable practice, but
knowledge of intent may assist the court in interpreting facts and predicting
consequences. 0 8
106. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264, passim. This same point was
admitted by Snap-On Tools during hearing. Brief for Respondent, pp. 21-23, Snap-On Tools
v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). See also 1964 Duke L.J. 408,413.
107. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 1 (1955).
108. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Assuming the Sealy and Schwinn cases are factually distinguishable, the
issue then becomes whether or not the distinctions are significant, or whether,
on the other hand, one of the two cases is wrongly decided. The Schwinn court
found an horizontal conspiracy on evidence quite like that of Sealy, in addition
to which Schwinn was held not guilty of price-fixing. Although there was a dif-
ference in the territorialization pattern, it can be explained on the simple ground
that Schwinn decided as a matter of business policy that it needed fewer out-
lets; Sealy believed it needed more. Neither is any less a system of closed ter-
ritories.
There is an additional factor complicating the Sealy case. As in Denison,
(where stock in Spring-Air was wholly owned by the licensees), 95 per cent of
Sealy stock is owned, in unequal amounts, by the licensees. Thus it is in reality a
joint venture, with the licensees agreeing among themselves, (through the licen-
sor Sealy) to allocate their own territories. In short, it is market allocation by
and for competitors. The question then is whether such activity by a licensor
is reasonably ancillary to waging effective competition when carried on by a
profit-making corporation (as contrasted to Spring-Air, which is arguably an
"umbrella" corporation, having no profit-making intent and functioning purely
for convenience in advertising and marketing functions). The situation can be
analogized either to a trade association or more classically, to a simple hori-
zontal agreement not to compete. Though the trade association problem is
usually one of determining when cooperation has become conspiracy, no such
issue exists here, as it is admitted closed territories restrain competition. Further,
their allocation goes far beyond permitted trade association activities. 1' 9 The
analogy of classical inter-manufacturer territorial allocation110 is, logically at
least, inescapable.
Because closed territories are usually -found in conjunction with other ar-
rangements, they raise the problem of whether multiple charges should be con-
sidered seriation as the Court of Appeals held in Snap-On Tools, or collectively
as the FTC contended. The Supreme Court favors the collective approach, at
least in price-fixing cases:
In any price-fixing case restrictive practices ancillary to the price-fixing
scheme are also quite properly restrained. Such was the United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 64 S. Ct. 805, 88
L. Ed. 1024, where price-fixing was an integral part of the whole dis-
tribution system."
This approach is certainly sensible in the territorial restrictions field, where an
exclusive franchise is usually found with the closed territory, and the economic
effects of the two are apt to be inextricable. In terms of realistic and effective
109. See Maple Flooring Mf'rs Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
110. See Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (1898).
111. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963).
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antitrust policy it seems the sound approach. There is a danger, however, that
a business ordered to cease using a certain over-all distribution plan will find
itself also forbidden to use practices, which although legal, are found to be
"ancillary" to the forbidden plan. Such a dilemma and its concommitant lengthy
litigation, could well lead to a per se approach to the question.112
There is always the possibility of a legislative solution. A recent bill has
proposed amendment of the FTCA by adding a new section providing that for
purposes of the FTCA and the Sherman Act,
a contract or agreement between a purchaser and a supplier restricting
the right of the purchaser to the distribution of the supplier's product
within a clearly delineated territorial area shall not in and of itself be
deemed to be an unfair method of competition, an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in commerce, a restraint of trade or commerce or a
monopoly or attempt to monopolize where the product or products
which is or are the subject of such exclusive territorial franchise agree-
ment or contract are in free and open competition with products of like
grade and quality produced by persons other than the supplier, and
where the purchaser under such exclusive territorial franchise agree-
ment or contract is in free and open competition with other vendors
of like or similar merchandise within the territorial area defined by
such agreement or contract and is not inhibited by the terms of such
agreement or contract from dealing in like or similar products of per-
sons other than the supplier.1 8
The bill, introduced as being particularly for the benefit of small businesses,
11
"
presents definitional problems. Under it, three requirements must be met be-
fore the closed territory will be allowed: product competition, purchaser com-
petition (that is, competition among the purchaser class using the closed terri-
tory), and freedom of that purchaser to deal in the goods of another (in reality
a facet of purchaser competition). The product must be in "free and open com-
petition." The first question is, just what is "free and open competition?" Would
an oligopolist be able to use closed territories, even though he may have only
two competitors?
The requirement that product competition be with goods "of like grade
and quality" and purchaser competition be "of like or similar merchandise" is
confusing. Assuming there is a distinction, why is it made? The phrase "like
grade and quality" as used in the Robinson-Patman Act refers to competition
among different products of one manufacturer, whereas in the proposed bill it
refers to competition among brands of different manufacturers. Does this mean
that judicial construction of the Robinson-Patman Act is to be adopted with
112. "Flexible standards may then have to give way once more to rigid rules in order
to deal with realities. Just as the standards of negligence, contributory negligence, and last
clear chance have had to retreat in favor of rules flashed by traffic lights, so also the
standard of the so-called rule of reason may have to withdraw farther to make room for
more per se rules which codify experience." Dixon, Recent Changes in Organization and
Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 ABA Sect. of Antitrust Law 252, 259 (1961),
113. H.R. 4862, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
114. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 189, at A-2 (Feb. 23, 1965).
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respect to "like grade and quality" product competition, but not with respect
to purchaser competition?
Any closed territorial arrangement may be said to "inhibit" dealing in
"like or similar products of persons other -than the supplier" simply because a
closed territory makes it easier to market goods. This forces a definition of "in-
hibit," probably in terms similar to the quantitative substantiality test of com-
merce foreclosed. The bill thus invites the courts to swim in the "... sink of un-
certainty and error,"' 1 5 of Robinson-Patman terminology.
An adequate legislative solution would probably be most desirable, in view
of the extensive use by modern business of franchises embodying contractual re-
strictions." 6 Other remedies have been suggested; one of the -foremost of -these
is the "area of primary responsibility." In Snap-On Tools the court dismissed the
FTC's area of primary responsibility as ". . . a sterile exercise in language,"
creating more problems than it solves.117 There is much merit in this position.
The term "area of primary responsibility" is a facile one whose only virtue is
uncertainty. It is a comparatively simple matter for a manufacturer to set up
standards of "responsibility" in terms of a closed territory."18 When geared to
a quota system, under which dealers must sell a certain amount in a given area,
it might conceivably become an added incentive to an aggressive, successful
dealer. Viewed as an entire plan, which might easily be more restrictive than a
simple closed territory, "its interpretation would only -tend to promote friction
115. Pascal, Pens~es, Sect. VII No. 434 (1670). See also Knopp, What Are "Commodi-
ties of Life Grade and Quality"? Journal of Marketing, 63 (July 1963); Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953): ". . . precision of expression is not an outstanding
characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act .... "
116. Contractual restrictions in franchises frequently include territorial and customer
restrictions, agreements to deal only in the franchisor's merchandise, to limit purchase of
supplies to firms named by the franchisor, to sell at franchisor-set prices, not to compete
with the franchisor for a certain time after cancellation of the franchise. Statement of
Eugene P. Foley, Administrator, Small Business Administration, Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Franchise growth has been very rapid, and its volume is now about $65 million a year.
Newsweek, Boss Yourself: The $15 Billion Boom (Feb. 22, 1965). The growth rate is
about 10% a year. The International Franchise Association estimated that in 1962 over 400
companies in eighty different fields franchised over 100,000 people, and that in 1963 there
were over 338,000 franchised outlets. See generally Konopa, What Is Meant by Franchise
Selling? Journal of Marketing, 35 (April 1963).
The vast majority of franchises sell highly standardized goods and/or services directly
to the consumer. Statement of Eugene P. Foley, Administrator, Small Business Adminis-
tration, supra at 2. Their reported failure rate is less than 17. Id. at 5.
The Small Business Administration spokesman mentioned that franchise-imposed
territorial restrictions are ". . . a very effective method of encouraging each franchisee to
advertise in his territory, secure in the knowledge that the soil thus fertilized will not be
invaded by others. Further, it serves to direct the competitive energies of all the franchisees
away from each other and against rival brands." Id. at 12.
Similarly, the SBA is concerned with per se rules, saying inter-competitor agreements
strengthen the position of small businesses competing against a few dominant firms, thus
improving competition. Id. at 16. In particular, it is concerned with the per se approach of
the FTC and Department of justice to the allocation of closed territories to franchisees. Id.
at 17.
117. Snap-On Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 1963).
118. Ibid.
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and misunderstanding among dealers.""19 Most writers prefer an application of
the equally uncertain rule of reason, with a variety of guides centering around
the hazy notion of legitimate business practice,'120 although there is some support
for per se illegality. 121
SUMMARY
Closed territories are usually found in conjunction with a franchise sys-
tem. Their use is an attempt by the manufacturer to market his goods effec-
tively. There is little case law on closed territories, although there are a number
of consent decrees forbidding their use.
The White Motor case gives valuable suggestions as to the Supreme Court's
view of this restraint, but the few available lower court decisions deal with
divergent fact situations, and generalization, at present, is difficult. 122 Thus,
the Sealy case allowed the use of closed territories if reasonably ancillary to
trademark exploitation, and absent any intent on the part of competitors to
divide the market among themselves. The court in Snap-On Tools found no real
anticompetitive effect, and concluded that a minimal curtailment of intra-
brand competition was justified if it stimulated inter-brand competition. The
Schwinn court struck down closed territories on the basis of an horizontal con-
spiracy, implemented by the manufacturer. But in Sandura, the court found
the use of closed territories justified as necessary for survival.
Because of the extensive use of franchise arrangements and territorial plan-
ning,12 an adequate legislative solution is needed. Closed territories should be
illegal only if used as a means to effect an unlawful objective, or if they ma-
119. Ibid. This would not seem to be the type of misunderstanding and friction that
would be of benefit to the consumer via price-cuts or improved services. But cf. Note, 1964
Duke LJ. 408, 413.
120. See, e.g., Jordan, Exclusive And Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws,
9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 111, 154 (1962): "Where the purpose of the restraint is to foster some
legitimate business interest the restraint should be prohibited only if some restraint of
competition in the market is dearly discernible."
121. See, e.g., Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question In The
Sherman Act, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286, 317 (1962): ". . . the impact of any dosed territorial
distributorship appears so likely to be anticompetitive that it is difficult to conceive any but
the most problematical and burdensome proffers of some saving grace. In such circumstances,
the invocation of a rule of per se illegality seems warranted." (Footnote omitted.)
Even with respect to a failing company, the author believes ". .. the closure should be
limited in time; if the company cannot put itself back together after a period the Court
deems reasonable, the workings of competition ought not to be interfered with further."
Ibid.
This is open to the objection that any antitrust law restricts the working of classical
unregulated competition. In the completely unregulated situation, a failing company could
use dosed territories to survive. If, to "promote competition," dosed territories were deemed
illegal per se, the company would be barred from using a marketing system which might,
in unregulated competition, keep it alive. Thus we have an example of the current anomaly
that imposed antitrust regulations become part of "the workings of competition."
122. "Aside from White Motor, the decided cases concerning various franchising
arrangements do not lend themselves to general propositions beyond the facts of each case,"
Statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1965).
123. See note 116, supra.
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terially reduce competition in the relevant market.124 The use of closed terri-
tories should not depend upon the availability of less restrictive alternatives,
125
as those alternatives may not be available to all competitors. The "area of pri-
mary responsibility" provides no certainty for business planning, and is an
open invitation to misunderstanding, confusion and litigation.
126
ALAN A. MrLinowsxi
124. One author adds a third situation in which dosed territories should be deemed
illegal-where they serve no valid business purpose. Jordan, Exclusive And Restricted Sales
Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C..A.L. Rev. 111, 155 (1962).
If there is no unlawful objective (such as monopolization, price-fixing, etc.) and no
material reduction of competition, it would not seem necessary for the courts to inquire into
the validity of the business purpose prompting the use of the dosed territory. Presumably, if
it is not useful, it will be dropped, or if retained, it will have no competitive effect; this still
leaves the courts with the power to strike it down if harmful.
125. "Nor do I believe that it should be incumbent on the manufacturer to prove, once
economic justification for the territorial restraints is shown, that he could not have squeezed
by with some lesser alternative restraint. Such a requirement would be wholly impractical
both from the legal and business points of view. Suppose it appears that, in order to
compete effectively against other brands, it was reasonably necessary for the manufacturer
to have independent dealers who would concentrate their efforts in their assigned territories
and not encroach upon their neighbors. How, as a practical matter, can the manufacturer go
further and prove that if he had employed an "area of primary responsibility" clause, for
example, his dealers would in fact have invaded each other's territory to his detriment?
Maybe they would have, and maybe they would not have. Maybe each would have stayed
in his own backyard even without a primary responsibility obligation. But surely the
manufacturer should not be forced to build a distribution system on a foundation of maybe's.
He should not be required, at the pain of incurring antitrust liability, to experiment with
"less restrictive alternatives" when, if he guesses wrong, he may find himself out of the
competitive race. It is all well and good to sit back and theorize about what the manufacturer
might get by with. But the manufacturer who operates in a heavily competitive business
world cannot afford the luxury of theorizing. He is on the firing line and should not be
second-guessed after the event if his own solution to the problem is reasonable." Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 167-68 (1963).
126. Both the Department of Justice and the FTC, with perhaps pardonable adversary
zeal, consider territorial restrictions illegal per se. Recently, the Department of Justice has
begun to cast a suspicious eye upon "areas of primary responsibility," perhaps in anticipation
of the confusion they would engender. Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 797 (1962).
Although the Department of Justice prevented White Motor from putting a primary
responsibility clause in the District Court's final decree, it later told the Supreme Court
that White Motor could have used an area of primary responsibility limitation as a less
restrictive alternativeI Brief for Appellee, pp. 25-26, Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 2, n.3.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
